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INTRODUCTION
It is an all too common story: A new organization with a fresh
approach bursts onto the nonprofit scene, shaking up the status quo
and spurring great leaps forward on their issue of choice, seeming to
make every dollar support greater impact than was possible ever
before. And yet, despite the ability to attract consistent funding and
inspire its peers, the organization shutters just years after its
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founding.1 Consider FORGE, an organization that helped over
70,000 refugees in Zambia and Botswana to build both short-term and
long-term capacity by supporting initiatives developed by the
beneficiaries themselves.2 Such initiatives included building libraries,
developing computer literacy and training programs, and establishing
micro-financing for agricultural workers.3
Despite FORGE’s
meaningful impact and responsive approach to its work, it closed after
a modest nine years.4 The self-reported cause of their closure: a lack
of unrestricted funding and, as a result, underinvestment in the
internal infrastructure necessary to maintain the organization.5
Dubbed the “Nonprofit Starvation Cycle” by the Stanford Social
Innovation Review, the cycle of underfunded nonprofits continues.6
There are a variety of reasons for this cycle: funders and nonprofits
alike conflate higher overhead with reduced impact; grant-making
foundations7 are reticent to provide more flexible funding; or, due to
restrictions placed on how grants to international organizations can
be made, funders are under the false perception that the only way to
make grants is through restricted project grants8 that do not allow for
investments in organizational infrastructure.9 Though the problem
1. See, e.g., Kjerstin Erickson, Nonprofit Emaciation: Confessions of a DoGooder Who Starved an Organization, ROOT CAUSE: PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Nov.
2004),
http://www.rootcause.org/blog/nonprofit-emaciation-confessions-of-a-dogooder-who-starved-an-organization [https://perma.cc/6YWN-UA9P].
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 2. While lifetimes of NGOs vary depending on the sector, most
NGOs seek a lifetime that spans decades rather than years in order to build and
sustain change over time. E.g., Randolph Kent et al., The Future of
NonGovernmental Organisations in the Humanitarian Sector, HUMANITARIAN
FUTURES PROGRAMME, at 3 (Aug. 2013), http://www.humanitarianfutures.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/The-Future-of-Humanitarian-NGOs-HFP-DiscussionPaper-Aug2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MRU-HQHM] (noting that many NGOs in
the humanitarian sector are reaching the age of fifty).
5. See Erickson, supra note 1.
6. See Ann Goggins Gregory & Don Howard, The Nonprofit Starvation Cycle,
STAN.
SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(2009),
at
49–50,
http://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_nonprofit_starvation_cycle
[https://perma.cc/99JU2AZM].
7. For the purposes of this Note, the term “foundation” refers to private
foundations, as well as both operating and non-operating foundations who operate
grant making programs. See Knowledge Base: What Is the Difference Between a
Private
Foundation
and
a
Public
Charity?,
GRANTSPACE,
http://grantspace.org/tools/knowledge-base/Funding-Resources/Foundations/privatefoundations-vs-public-charities [https://perma.cc/7F3N-J29M] (defining “Private
foundations”).
8. See infra Section I.B.1.
9. See infra Section I.B.1.
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likely stems from some combination of these issues, this Note focuses
on the latter two issues.
Funders are beginning to acknowledge the issues raised above, and
there is a growing movement to provide greater flexibility in the
grants that they make.10 This flexibility ensures that grantees can
remain responsive to the field and effective in creating the change
that both the grantee and the grantor want to see in society, while
also building the institutional capacity necessary to function and
adapt to each organization’s constantly changing environment most
effectively.11 The most common way for a foundation to provide this
flexibility is through a general support grant—a grant in which funds
are not tied to particular budget lines or outcomes, and instead
provides the grantee with flexibility to determine how funds are
expended.12 This approach stands in sharp contrast to projectsupport grants—the more typical approach to grant making—where
funds are tied to particular outcomes and budget lines and, if the
grantee desires to shift funds between budget-lines, they must receive
prior approval from the funder.13
For foundations that have an international focus, however,
providing general support grants is typically understood to be a rare
possibility. When a foundation14 is funding an organization that is not
10. See infra Section I.B.1; see also The Beauty of the General Support Grant,
GRANTCRAFT (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.grantcraft.org/takeaways/the-beauty-of-thegeneral-support-grant [https://perma.cc/9VXR-DPPW]; J MCCRAY, GRANTMAKERS
FOR EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS, IS GRANTMAKING GETTING SMARTER?: A
NATIONAL
STUDY
OF
PHILANTHROPIC
PRACTICE
7
(2014),
https://www.giarts.org/sites/default/files/Is-Grantmaking-Getting-Smarter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8B7Z-F3T6].
11. See generally Gregory & Howard, supra note 6, at 53; The Beauty of the
General Support Grant, supra note 10; see also MCCRAY, supra note 10, at 7, 23.
12. See, e.g., General Operating Support (or Unrestricted) Grants, GRANTCRAFT
(Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.grantcraft.org/takeaways/general-operating-support-orunrestricted-grants [https://perma.cc/2E2R-MBRT] (discussing how general support
allows grantees to “invest” in themselves by building capacity or investing in new
areas of work); Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the Capacity of Our
Nonprofit
Sector,
GRANTCRAFT
(Oct.
15,
2013),
http://www.grantcraft.org/blog/unrestricted-core-support-strengthening-the-capacityof-our-nonprofit-secto [https://perma.cc/XAD7-9RCV] (“ . . . [C]ore support funding
provides nonprofit organizations with the working capital necessary to sustain day-today operations and to build a well-managed and fully operational infrastructure.”);
see infra Section I.B.2.
13. E.g., The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10 (“‘Engage
grantees more, but put fewer restrictions on their money.’ If the money isn’t
restricted, then you don’t have to get into silly dances about how they met the letter
of the contract and you met the letter of the tax laws, and you can really engage them
about how to be as effective as possible.”); see infra Section I.B.1.
14. See infra Section I.A.
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a registered 501(c)(3) public charity15 (which encompasses many
international organizations), they must adhere to a particular set of
rules under a framework called expenditure responsibility.16 While
these rules seek to ensure that funds are spent for charitable
purposes, they are consistently interpreted to be quite limiting in
terms of the amount of flexibility that foundations can provide to
grantees.17 This Note argues that there is greater potential for
flexibility in the interpretation of the expenditure responsibility rules
than practitioners commonly recognize. Accordingly, this Note is
dedicated to offering an interpretation for how foundations can make
general support grants under the expenditure responsibility rules
while staying within the margins of pre-existing law. Section I.A of
this Note explores some background on what foundations are, their
role in society, and how they foster change through grant making.
Following an explanation in Section I.B of the basic types of grants
that foundations can provide, Section I.C then explores the particular
legal framework that governs grant making to international
organizations. In Part II, this Note identifies the sources of tension
between common foundation practice and the plain text of the law
with regards to general support in the expenditure responsibility
context, and offers a variety of legal and policy explanations for both
why it is and is not appropriate to interpret the expenditure
responsibility requirements in a manner that allows for general
support grant making. In Part III, this Note offers three potential
approaches to providing a general support grants under the
expenditure responsibility rules and several recommendations to the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) for how to clarify relevant
regulations to confirm that the proposed approaches rest on solid
legal ground.

15. A 501(c)(3) organization is organized and operated for charitable,
educational, religious, scientific, or other reasons specified in §501(c)(3) of the U.S.
Tax Code. See infra note 20.
16. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2018); IRM
7.27.19 (Feb. 22, 1999); see infra Section I.C.
17. See, e.g., LISA NORTON, HOW TO BE A GLOBAL NONPROFIT: LEGAL AND
PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES 49 (2012) (“Expenditure
responsibility can only be used when a grant is made for a specific, preapproved
project.”); see also JODY BLAZEK, TAX PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE FOR TAXEXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 492 (5th ed. 2012) (noting that grant terms must “clearly
state the purpose for the grant”).
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I. PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
Part I provides an overview of private foundations, including what
foundations are, their role in society, and how they foster change
through grant making. Part I then proceeds to explain the basic types
of grants that foundations can provide before exploring the particular
legal framework that governs grant making to international
organizations.
A. Foundations and Their Role in Civil Society
A private foundation is a tax-exempt organization established for a
charitable purpose, generally by one person or family with a large
amount of wealth.18 Foundations seek to foster change in the world
and wield their influence through the disbursement of funds to other
organizations or individuals with a deep commitment to and expertise
in the chosen area of concern.19 Charitable purposes are any
activities that seek to provide:
relief of the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged;
advancement of religion; advancement of education or science;
erecting or maintaining public buildings, monuments, or works;
lessening the burdens of government; lessening neighborhood
tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; defending human
and civil rights secured by law; and combating community
deterioration and juvenile delinquency. 20

Along the same lines, foundations are not allowed to engage in
lobbying activities or political campaigns.21 Put simply, being
charitable means that an organization is serving a “public rather than
a private interest.”22
Foundations are regulated by the IRS and must follow relevant
aspects of the U.S. Tax Code, the Code of Federal Regulations (the
“C.F.R.”), and a series of IRS guidelines shared in the Internal

18. See
Foundation
Basics,
COUNCIL
ON
FOUNDATIONS,
http://www.cof.org/content/foundation-basics#what_is_a_foundation
[https://perma.cc/E6TC-PTYU].
19. See id.
20. Exempt Purposes – Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERVICE,
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitableorganizations/exempt-purposes-internal-revenue-code-section-501c3
[https://perma.cc/P59M-FQ2C].
21. See 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d) (2014).
22. MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 107 (4th ed. 2013); see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
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Revenue Manual (the “I.R.M.”).23 Given the positive potential
impact of foundations, the U.S. government has incentivized the
creation of and donation to foundations by making those
contributions tax deductible.24 There is contradictory evidence about
whether or not the tax deductible nature of donations has a positive,
neutral, or even negative impact on the amount of donations made to
foundations;25 however, tax deductibility is generally seen as a
positive incentive.26 For existing foundations, tax-exempt status is
generally viewed as crucial to their long-term survival; therefore,
foundations have every incentive to adhere to the IRS regulations
governing how their tax deductible dollars can be spent in order to
retain their tax-exempt status.27
Private foundations have played—and continue to play—a key role
in civil society, providing resources for underfunded interests and
innovation, pushing the status quo, and supporting a diversity of
viewpoints in society at-large.28 By virtue of their concentrated
wealth, foundations hold a nearly unmatched ability to channel
resources towards the provision of crucial support and services in
sectors where the government cannot or chooses not to provide
support.29 In fact, this ability to fill the gaps left by the government is
often recognized as the justification for providing foundations with
tax exemption.30

23. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d) (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2015); IRM
7.27.19 (Feb. 22, 1999).
24. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018).
25. See RANDALL G. HOLCOMBE, WRITING OFF IDEAS: TAXATION,
FOUNDATIONS, AND PHILANTHROPY IN AMERICA 87 (1st ed. 2000) (“. . . the tax
system has the potential to exert a significant influence on the resources that flow
into the nonprofit sector of the economy, although predictions that if tax deductibility
of contributions were eliminated the sector would lose most of its funding are likely
to be overstated.”).
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. E.g., Barry Gaberman, The Role of Foundations in Society, ALLIANCE MAG.,
Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.alliancemagazine.org/article/the-role-of-foundations-insociety/ [https://perma.cc/R97M-LC68]; JOAN E. SPERO, FOUNDATION CENTER, THE
GLOBAL
ROLE
OF
U.S.
FOUNDATIONS
33
(2010),
http://foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/global_role_of_us_foundatio
ns.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WVF-U6S6] (“What foundations can do is to identify gaps,
needs, and niches where their resources can contribute to pieces of the problem, to
aspects of social, economic, and political change . . . ”); Carl Schramm, Law Outside
the Market: The Social Utility of Private Foundations, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
355, 358–62 (2006).
29. See HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 2.
30. See SANDERS, supra note 22, at 102 n.299 (“[T]he exemption from taxation of
money or property devoted to charitable or other purposes is based upon the theory
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Foundations also resource innovation, fostering important strides
in social progress by funding thinkers, innovators, and social pioneers
in fields ranging from medicine to the arts. Funding “laboratories” of
experimentation, foundations can help find solutions to some of
society’s biggest challenges that, once found, can then be outsourced
to the government or other service providers who cannot afford to
undertake such experimentation themselves.31 Andrew Carnegie—
forefather of one of the most prominent modern-day foundations—is
credited with the provocative quote that “wealth, passing through the
hands of the few, can be made a much more potent force for the
elevation of our race than if it had been distributed in small sums to
the people themselves.”32 Though controversial, this statement does
illustrate the potency with which foundations can contribute to the
broader public good.
There are many examples of the impact that foundations have
made on particular issues, in particular fields and movements, and in
the world, generally. For example, the Kellogg Foundation, an
institution that provides higher education for roughly ten million
students per year, was an initial funder of community colleges in the
United States.33 In the field of public health, foundations such as the
Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation have provided
AIDS medication to tens of thousands of individuals, funded public
education campaigns that have focused on awareness of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic, and supported public-private partnerships to
search for a vaccine to the disease.34 Foundations can also play a
crucial role in global politics: through funding the building of libraries
in the former Soviet Union, the Open Society Foundations helped

that the government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial
burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.”).
31. See Schramm, supra note 28; see also HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 28
(discussing foundations’ ability to examine the causes of problems rather than simply
attempting to treat the problem).
32. Christopher Caldwell, Donor Beware: The New Realities of Philanthropy,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/donor-beware-the-newrealities-of-philanthropy-1457721449 [https://perma.cc/6VHS-46DG].
33. See
Foundation
Growth,
W.K.
KELLOGG
FOUNDATION,
https://www.wkkf.org/who-we-are/history-legacy [https://perma.cc/D83R-L2YZ].
34. See
HIV
Strategy
Overview,
GATES
FOUNDATION,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/What-We-Do/Global-Health/HIV
[https://perma.cc/5FPC-DM27];
HIV/AIDS,
ROCKEFELLER
FOUNDATIONS,
https://rockfound.rockarch.org/hiv/aids [https://perma.cc/VMF3-F9E4].
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bolster people’s movements that ultimately led to the fall of the
Soviet regime.35
On the other hand, the same concentration of wealth that allows
private foundations to have the impact described above is also why
private foundations have been the target of continuous skepticism
since their inception. The impetus for this skepticism is two-fold.
First, foundations are financially independent in that they generally
have one individual or family of donors who provide their funding.36
By placing those funds into an endowment, the funds become selfsustaining over time with little room for regulation.37 Second, and
related to the first issue, private foundations are broadly perceived to
lack accountability.38 Many charitable organizations are perceived as
accountable to the public because the organization relies on the
general public to be its donors; therefore, in order to ensure
continued funding, organizations shift their strategies to remain
consistent with what the public believes is the best use of charitable
assets.39
In contrast, foundations are financially independent;
therefore, they are not subject to the same pressure to alter their
strategies to the public’s preferences and could, ostensibly, undertake
activities in the name of the public good that the public, themselves,
do not desire.40
B.

Foundation Grant Making

The main tool through which private foundations seek to foster
social change is through the disbursement of funds to organizations
and individuals through a mechanism called a grant. Grants are

35. See
About
Us,
History,
OPEN
SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/history
[https://perma.cc/44EYVYPM].
36. See Foundation Basics, supra note 18.
37. See HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 2 (“Foundations become wealthier and
wealthier, and continue to undertake expenditures to further their visions of the
public good.”).
38. See, e.g., id. at 3 (“The perceived problems stem from the fact that a small
group of foundation trustees are able to control a substantial amount of money that
can have an impact on political and social policy without being accountable to anyone
for their actions. The money is not theirs. It was earned by others who, for the most
part, have long been dead. Now control of these fortunes has been given to a group
of unelected and unrepresentative trustees.”).
39. See generally NORTON, supra note 17, at 43–44.
40. See, e.g., HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 2 (“The primary problem from a
public policy standpoint is that foundation trustees have a tremendous amount of
wealth at their disposal that they can spend as they see fit. While they are charged
with acting in the public interest, they are accountable to nobody.”).
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disbursements of funds—which can include loans, in-kind donations,
and program-related investments—given to public charities; i.e.,
entities registered under section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Tax Code with
a verified charitable purpose.41 Though it would be easy to think of
grants as gifts, grants are, in fact, contracts: grantors make grants for
particular purposes and do not tend to expect the funds ever to be
returned.42
Overall, grants fall into two legal categories: general support and
project support. In broad strokes, there are fewer restrictions and
requirements tied to general support grants than project support
grants, though the restrictions provided in a grant agreement can vary
in depth for both types of grants.43 Put simply, the amount of
autonomy a grantee has to determine how to spend grant funds is
inversely proportional to the amount of specificity or restrictions that
the grantor provides in the grant agreement. The following sections
will explore the particular nature of both of these types of grants.

1.

Project Support Grants

Project support grants provide funds for specific, pre-determined
projects or areas of work that have a timeline, budget, and discrete
objectives.44 When a foundation is considering providing a project
support grant to an organization, it solicits both narrative and
financial proposals that outline the specifics for the work to be
funded.45 The financial proposal must be tied to the proposed
activities, and must exclude certain prohibited expenditures (e.g.,
lobbying activities, the purchase of capital equipment over a de
minimis amount, or the funding of grants to individuals).46 In order

41. See 26 I.R.C. § 4945 (2014); 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018); FRANCES HILL &
DOUGLAS MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 11-79 (2002–2009).
42. See, e.g., Grants Management 101, ROCKY MOUNTAIN PUBLIC HEALTH
TRAINING CENTER (2015), http://www.grantsmanagement101.org/managementbasics.html [https://perma.cc/BL9N-EEX9].
43. See generally Program Grants vs. Operating Support, AMPLIFIER,
http://www.amplifiergiving.org/media/resources/Program_Grants_vs._General_Opera
ting_Support__including_8_Tips_for_Being_a_Good_Donor.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6QQA-9CCR].
44. See, e.g., id.
45. See, e.g., id.
46. See 26 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). Given the tax-exempt nature of foundation
funds, the IRS has an established interest in how those funds are expended. In the
1960s, the misuse of certain foundation funds to both engage in political activities
(specifically, the election of the first black mayor in Cleveland, Ohio) and to pay
individuals (several Kennedy staffers were given payments to ease their transition out
of the administration following the President’s death) prompted skepticism, and the
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to show that funds were expended for acceptable purposes and in the
spirit of what was outlined in the original proposal, project support
grants require both narrative and financial reporting at their close,
with an option for interim reporting throughout the grant term.47
Project support grants are the more restrictive of the two types of
grants,48 allowing donors to fund only those projects they are
specifically interested in and, if they choose, to play a role in shaping
those projects—both during the proposal and project implementation
stages. Funders do tend to remain significantly involved in the efforts
they fund through project support grants, approving line-item shifts in
the budget and providing advice on project approach and
implementation.49 As project support grants allow funders to remain
involved in how grant funds are expended, they are the more popular
type of grant.50 In addition, though most grants are made to 501(c)(3)
organizations, it is generally understood that project support grants
can be made to organizations other than 501(c)(3) entities, because
the specificity with which the grants are made allows funders to
ensure that the activities the grant is supporting are in furtherance of
a charitable purpose.51

2.

General Support Grants

General support grants, in contrast to project support grants,
provide a grantee with unrestricted funds that the grantee can
determine how to expend.52 In other words, general support grant
funds are not tied to particular projects, outcomes, or timelines
dictated by the funder; instead, grantees can make determinations
about how they can best utilize their funds, be it for an existing body
of work, to develop a new body of work, to cover overhead costs, to
support internal capacity-building efforts, or even to adjust the way

eventual passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 92,
94–96; H.R. Rep. No. 91-413 (1969); John R. Labovitz, The Impact of Private
Foundation Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 , 3 J. LEG. STUD. 63, 67 (1974).
47. See U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, I.R.S. Pub. No. 1771 (Rev. 3-2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1771.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GRJ-3JDK].
48. See Program Grants vs. Operating Support, supra note 43.
49. See id.
50. See generally id.
51. See infra Section I.C.
52. See What Is General Operating Support and Why Is It Important?,
GRANTMAKERS
FOR
EFFECTIVE
ORGANIZATIONS
(May
29,
2014),
https://www.geofunders.org/resources/what-is-general-operating-support-and-why-isit-important-678 [https://perma.cc/A275-UPVL ].
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funds are allocated mid-course in order to remain as responsive and
effective as possible.53
General support grants can be more legally complicated than
project grants. The same legal restrictions apply to general support
grants as apply to project support grants—e.g., as noted above,
foundations are not allowed to conduct nor support any lobbying or
political activities—yet 501(c)(3) public charities are allowed to
conduct or participate in a de minimis amount of those activities.54
Logically, this presents a challenge for a foundation that wishes to
provide a general support grant to a 501(c)(3) organization that
conducts a de minimis amount of lobbying or political activity:
Though the general support grant is supposed to provide the grantee
with full flexibility to determine how the funds are expended, the
foundation’s funds cannot technically support the grantee’s de
minimis lobbying or political activities. The IRS has responded to
this potential challenge by creating a general support safe harbor that
allows a foundation to provide a general support grant to a 501(c)(3)
organization that conducts a de minimis amount of lobbying or
political activity, provided the foundation remains completely handsoff and does not earmark (or denote) funds for any particular
purpose.55 If the foundation does require funds to be expended on
particular projects or activities, they will lose the protection of the
general support safe harbor; in that case, if the grantee ends up using
those funds on lobbying in pursuit of those earmarked projects or
activities, the foundation will face excise taxes and other potential
penalties.56 In the alternative, if the foundation stays true to the
notion of giving the grantee autonomy about how funds are spent, the
IRS is willing to accept that money is fungible and will not punish the
foundation for having supported an organization that conducts a de
minimis amount of those otherwise prohibited activities.57 Therefore,
in order to retain the legal safety of the safe harbor when making a
general support grant, it is crucial that a foundation avoid both the

53. See, e.g., General Operating Support (or Unrestricted) Grants, supra note 12
(discussing how general support allows grantees to “invest” in themselves by building
capacity or investing in new areas of work); Unrestricted Core Support:
Strengthening the Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; The Beauty of
the General Support Grant, supra note 10.
54. See Allocation of Costs to Lobbying Activities, 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-28(g) (1995).
55. See IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999).
56. See id.; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2015).
57. See IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999); Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. §
53.4945-5 (2015).
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action and appearance of earmarking—or denoting—funds for
particular purposes.
There are three main ways that foundations approach general
support grant making in order to stay within the confines of this
general support safe harbor and, as a result, adhere to the intention of
providing grantees with greater agency through the use of a general
support grant. The simplest way is to take a “blank check”
approach.58 Through this approach, the foundation provides a grant
without requiring a proposal or any follow-up reporting.59 With such
sparse requirements, it is hard to generate the perception that the
foundation is earmarking funds for any particular purpose.60
However, this approach is also quite limiting: without insight into the
work of a grantee organization, the grant maker has very little
knowledge about the organization’s role in the field or how the
foundation’s contribution aided its efforts.61
In addition, the
foundation loses key insights into the field of interest. Therefore,
many funders prefer to have some higher level of engagement than
this.62
Even while staying within the confines of the general support safe
harbor, the donor can have some basic conversations about the
organization’s overall goals to ensure sufficient strategic alignment
before providing funding.63 Therefore, a second approach to general
support grant making can involve a proposal. Rather than focusing
on the project-level detail, however, the focus is on the overall
organizational strategy and objectives.64 Often, a grantee uses its
annual strategy document or action plan as the proposal.65 The
foundation might have some conversations with the grantee, but such
conversations focus only on the grantee’s organizational strategies
and objectives, without indicating any clear preferences for how the
grantee spends the funds.66 The grant agreement in this situation is
58. Interview with Nicole Campbell, Deputy General Counsel, Open Society
Foundations, in New York, N.Y. (Feb. 3, 2016).
59. Id.
60. As required by IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999).
61. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58.
62. Id.
63. See generally IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999); What Is General Operating
Support and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52 (“Despite the unrestricted nature of
general operating support, providing it does not mean that grantmakers forfeit the
ability to influence how grant dollars are spent or to track the outcomes of their
investments.”).
64. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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also sufficiently broad, allowing the grantee to remain in control of
how funds are spent and—as long as they remain within the spirit of
their original proposal—to shift their work as new circumstances or
opportunities arise.67 With regards to reporting, the grantee can
report on any activities that were discussed in the original proposal
(the foundation cannot request further information on any one
particular project or body of work), and the organization can provide
their overall income and expenditures for the year, as long as the
foundation’s funds are not attributed to particular projects
(attribution of the foundation funds to particular activities increases
potential possibilities for or appearances of earmarking).68
Ultimately, this second approach allows the foundation to have an
understanding of what the grantee plans to do and what they have
actually achieved (which is generally understood to be crucial
information for a foundation), while not earmarking their funds for
particular purposes.69 Yet this approach comes with greater risk than
the “blank check” approach. By engaging in conversation about
grantee activities, the foundation is more at risk of appearing as if
they earmarked funds for particular purposes. This appearance of
earmarking could become problematic if the grantee uses the funds
on prohibited expenditures.
Though the second option does provide a foundation with greater
insight into—and opportunity to engage with—the grantee’s strategy,
there are foundations that desire to have still more engagement in the
work of the grantee, even when giving a general support grant.
Therefore, there is a third potential approach, often referred to as
“negotiated general support.”70
Through this approach, the
foundation has clear conversations with the grantee about what
specific projects the foundation wants to see the grantee undertake.71

67. IRM 7.27.19.6.14.1 (Feb. 22, 1999) (“[T]he mere use of grant funds for
activities not planned in the original budget is not treated as a diversion. The use of
the grant funds must actually be inconsistent with the original purposes of the grant
as described in the grant agreement.”).
68. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58.
69. Id.
70. See Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: General Operating Support (or
Unrestricted)
Grants,
GRANTCRAFT
(Feb.
18,
2015),
http://www.grantcraft.org/casestudies/bill-and-melinda-gates-foundation
[https://perma.cc/D33X-7UNX]; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the
Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; What Is General Operating Support
and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52.
71. See Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: General Operating Support (or
Unrestricted) Grants, supra note 70; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the
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Though this does mean that the foundation is making its priorities
clear to the grantee organization, a foundation may remain within the
general support safe harbor by not requiring the grant funds to be
spent on any one of the specific projects discussed during these
conversations; instead, the grantee retains full control over how the
funds are allocated.72 In other words, a negotiated general support
approach de-links the way grant funds are expended from the projects
or outcomes that a foundation is interested in a grantee pursuing.
Reporting for negotiated general support grants generally must avoid
attribution of foundation funds to particular activities, as well, in
order to avoid the actual or perceived earmarking of funds for
particular activities.73
Foundations are generally wary of this
approach, however, because conversations with a grantee could easily
be seen to express specific foundation interests in how they want
grant money to be spent.74
The challenge with general support grant making is that the
grantee’s autonomy is inversely proportional to that of the granting
foundation.75 Money is power to a foundation, and by choosing to
cede control of how money is spent, the foundation is choosing to
cede that influence as well. Given that foundations determine the
types of support they provide to grantees, this means that foundations
must choose to relinquish a significant amount of control and
influence over how the funds are expended, something foundations—
with their own theories of change, strategies, and internal
accountability structures—naturally hesitate to do.76
Whether
consciously or subconsciously, foundation staff members often feel
that they do not have a sufficient level of trust with grantees to fully
relinquish decision-making authority.77 Hurdles include concerns
about grantee capacity to manage the funds or implement projects,
but also go to foundations’ own ego and self-perception.78 Lastly,
Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; What Is General Operating Support
and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52.
72. See Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: General Operating Support (or
Unrestricted) Grants, supra note 70; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the
Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; What Is General Operating Support
and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52. See generally IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb.
22,1999).
73. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., What Is General Operating Support and Why Is It Important?, supra
note 52.
76. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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unless foundations use the “blank check” approach, foundations often
perceive that general support grants are more legally risky than
project support grants.79 For all of these reasons, general support
grants make up less than one-third of all grants made each year across
all foundations.80
Despite these concerns, there is an increasingly accepted
understanding in the philanthropic community that providing
unrestricted funding to grantees is more effective than providing
project grants.81 Given that grantees are generally much closer to and
possess greater expertise on their issues of focus than donors,
allowing grantees greater control over how grant funds are expended
can result in much more effective and responsive programming.82
The complex fields in which charitable organizations work are
constantly evolving and changing: political opportunities appear and
disappear, natural disasters occur suddenly, and the complex ecosystem that is civil society and public discourse changes in slight ways
that make new approaches or strategies more effective than
expected.83 These constant changes in the environment make it
crucial for organizations to be able to adjust their projects in realtime, adapting to the ever-evolving dynamics on the ground. Not only
is it more efficient for grantees to be able to make those decisions
without having to receive prior approval from the donor, but this
approach is also more responsive to the complexities of the real world
and can lead to greater impact.84
Allowing the grantee to remain in control of how funds are spent
also is crucial for avoiding donor-driven agendas. The altruism of
donors is complicated, with only the most mature of donors giving for

79. See supra Section I.B.2. (“Yet this approach comes with greater risk than the
‘blank check’ approach. By engaging in conversation about grantee activities, the
foundation is more at risk of appearing as if they have earmarked funds for particular
purposes. This appearance of earmarking could become problematic if the grantee
uses the funds on prohibited expenditures.”).
80. See MCCRAY, supra note 10, at 7; see also infra Section II.D.
81. E.g., How Can We Be More Supportive of Nonprofit Financial
Sustainability?, GRANTMAKERS FOR EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS (Mar. 5, 2014),
https://www.geofunders.org/resources/how-can-we-be-more-supportive-of-nonprofitfinancial-sustainability-662 [https://perma.cc/C5WH-NVH7]; The Beauty of the
General Support Grant, supra note 10.
82. How Can We Be More Supportive of Nonprofit Financial Sustainability?,
supra note 81; The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10.
83. E.g., The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10; Unrestricted
Core Support: Strengthening the Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12.
84. The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10; Unrestricted Core
Support: Strengthening the Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12.
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reasons that truly focus on the beneficiary rather than being
motivated by more personal motives, such as tax breaks, the desire to
be remembered, or from a sense of guilt.85 Accordingly, most donors
have particular ideas about the type of change they want to support
or the specific types of projects they want implemented with their
money.86 Unfortunately, due to their distance from the issues,
communities, and the nuances involved with the issue at-hand, their
interventions often result in misguided attempts at creating change.87
Some of the most enlightening examples come from the field of
international development, though these issues also arise in the civil
and political realm.88
General support also reduces the likelihood that a grantee will
conduct activities solely because the donor desires them.89 Even
when donors are giving for purely altruistic reasons, and would (at
least theoretically) avoid the problems described above, grantees—in
order to increase their chances of receiving future funding—will often
attempt to anticipate what it is donors are looking for.90 Though this
can still occur within the context of a general support grant, it is much
less likely to happen when a foundation is having only high-level
conversations with an organization, rather than the detailed

85. Roy Menninger, Foundation Work May be Hazardous to Your Mental
Health: Some Occupational Dangers of Grant Making (and Grant Receiving) in

GIVING WELL, DOING GOOD: READINGS FOR THOUGHTFUL PHILANTHROPISTS 129
(Amy A. Kass ed., 1981) (“Reasons for giving come from several sources. They’re
not always conscious; one can discern, if one looks carefully, several lower levels of
motivation even in the most altruistic acts of giving. The first level if the narcissistic
level. A donor gives money for honor and glory — for the name on the
building . . . The second level of giving is moralistic and conscience driven, with guilt
as the motivation . . . . The third level — which might be described as the most
mature form of giving — is [focused on] the other, the recipient; not the self, the
giver . . . [G]iving is never pure. The most altruistic and most noble giving also
contains elements of narcissism and guilt . . . .”).
86. See, e.g., Michael Hobbes, Stop Trying to Save the World, NEW REPUBLIC
(Nov. 17, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/120178/problem-internationaldevelopment-and-plan-fix-it [https://perma.cc/U5TR-TP5V].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the Capacity of Our Nonprofit
Sector, supra note 12 (“If our goal is to help organizations become stronger and,
therefore, more effective, we need nonprofits to tell us what they need – not what
they think we want to hear. And then we must have the willingness to be responsive
and provide the flexible and long-term funding needed to build strong organizations
and deliver effective programs.”).
90. Id.
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conversations that can occur within the context of a project support
grant.91
Lastly, general support grants help organizations to develop.92
When an organization receives fully restricted funding, they are not
able to move funds around as new situations arise or new needs
develop.93 Though an organization might have enough funding to
cover their projects and (ideally) the associated core costs, they may
not have funds to, for example, purchase new financial software, send
their staff to relevant training, fund a search committee for a pending
leadership transition, or even have the flexibility to undertake a new
project if a window of unforeseen opportunity arises.94 With a
general support grant, the grantee organization has that helpful
flexibility, and is able to use the funds the way they need to use them
the most.95 This bolsters the ability of the organization’s leadership to
respond appropriately to the organization’s most pressing needs.96
C.

Grant Making to International Organizations: The Expenditure
Responsibility Requirements

As described above, foundations are allowed to use their taxexempt funds to provide either project support or general support to
organizations defined as charitable by section 501(c)(3) of the U.S.
Tax Code.97 However, there are many organizations that fall outside
of this categorization, including certain domestic organizations—such
as neighborhood organizations, public hospitals, and housing
developments—as well as the majority of foreign-based

91. Id.
92. E.g., How Can We Be More Supportive of Nonprofit Financial
Sustainability?, supra note 81; How Do We Know if a Grantee Is a Good Candidate
for General Operating Support?, GRANTMAKERS FOR EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATIONS
(July 15, 2014), https://www.geofunders.org/resources/how-do-we-know-if-a-granteeis-a-good-candidate-for-general-operating-support-652
[https://perma.cc/9N72XXV5]; Support Nonprofit Resilience, GRANTMAKERS FOR EFFECTIVE
ORGANIZATIONS,
http://www.geofunders.org/smarter-grantmaking/nonprofitresilience/financial-sustainability [https://perma.cc/8VYV-B7WE]; Anna Pond,
Supporting Grantee Capacity: Strengthening Effectiveness Together, GRANTCRAFT
(2015),
at
6,
http://www.grantcraft.org/assets/content/resources/guide_capacity_interactive.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WC2Z-CWPR]; What Is General Operating Support and Why Is It
Important?, supra note 52.
93. What Is General Operating Support and Why Is It Important?, supra note 52.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 3–4.
96. Id.
97. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014).
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organizations.98 The IRS does make it possible to fund the charitable
activities of these organizations with tax-exempt dollars, but
alternative regulations govern and change the nature of the types of
grants (e.g., project support or general support) that a foundation can
provide.99
In fact, there are two procedures through which foundations can
approach grant making in this context: equivalency determination or
expenditure responsibility. Equivalency determination is the process
through which a foundation deems an organization to be the
equivalent of a 501(c)(3).100 Expenditure responsibility is the process
through which a foundation ensures that grant funds are spent on
only those activities that a 501(c)(3) organization can conduct.101
Though there are benefits and detriments to both approaches, both
options serve to assure the IRS that tax-exempt foundation dollars
are being used to support charitable activities only.
First, through an equivalency determination, a foundation or
qualified external tax expert determines102 that a foreign organization
is the equivalent of a U.S. 501(c)(3) organization.103 An organization

98. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); see also Charitable,
etc. Contributions and Gifts, 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2017).
99. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(a)(1) (2015).
100. “Equivalency determination (ED) is a process by which a U.S. grantmaker
evaluates whether an intended foreign grantee is the equivalent of a U.S. public
charity. The grant maker must collect a set of detailed information about the
grantee’s operations and finances and make a reasonable determination of its
equivalency.” See What Is Equivalency Determination, NGO SOURCE,
http://www.ngosource.org/how-it-works/what-is-equivalency-determination
[https://perma.cc/VL26-ABWH].
101. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(a)(1) (2015); IRM. 7.27.19 (Feb. 22, 1999).
102. Foundations can make this determination themselves, on the advice of
counsel. The rigidity of the requirements makes foundations confident in their
determinations. Alternatively, foundations can use an outside provider to make
equivalency determinations, such as NGO Source. See NGO SOURCE,
http://www.ngosource.org/ [https://perma.cc/P77F-CQMU].
103. Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 CB 507 (superseded by Rev. Proc. 2017-53); see What
Is Equivalency Determination, supra note 100; see also Betsy Adler & Stephanie
Petit, Equivalency or Expenditure Responsibility? A Guide in Plain English , 73
INTERNATIONAL
DATELINE
(2005),
https://www.adlercolvin.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Legal-Dimension-Equivalency-or-ExpenditureResponsibility-00069171xA3536.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWZ4-2WSP]; see generally
Stephanie L. Petit, IRS Releases Revenue Procedure 2017-53 on Foreign Public
Charity Equivalency Determinations., ADLER & COLVIN BLOG (Sept. 15, 2017),
https://www.adlercolvin.com/blog/2017/09/15/irs-releases-revenue-procedure-2017-53on-foreign-public-charity-equivalence-determinations/ [PERMA] (explaining that
Rev. Proc. 2017 modifies and supersedes Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 CB 507).
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can be deemed the equivalent of a U.S. 501(c)(3) if it meets a series of
tests that align with the 501(c)(3) requirements, including having a
diversity of funding sources, meeting minimum distribution
requirements, adhering to regulations on self-dealing, and conducting
charitable activities.104 Once a foundation considers the organization
to be an equivalent, an organization can be treated just as any other
501(c)(3) organization and can receive both project support and
general support grants with tax-exempt funds.105 This makes grant
making quite easy; therefore, equivalency determination is generally
considered more favorable than expenditure responsibility.106
Despite this favorability, however, many organizations cannot achieve
equivalency determination.107 Equivalency determination is difficult
to achieve for a variety of reasons, including language barriers,
paperwork/accounting requirements, the time that the process takes,
or the variety of sources from which an organization receives its
funding.108
When equivalency determination is not possible,
foundations must turn to expenditure responsibility in order to make
grants using their tax-exempt funds.
Expenditure responsibility is the second alternative for how a
foundation can provide funding to an organization that is not a
501(c)(3) public charity (or equivalent), yet still retain the tax-exempt
status for the grant funds.109 Like equivalency determination, the
purpose of expenditure responsibility is to ensure that U.S. money
being donated abroad (or to any other organization that is not
registered as charitable) is used for approved, exempt purposes.110
However, rather than focusing on the overall nature of the
organization as a whole—as equivalency determination does—
104. Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 CB 507 (superseded by Rev. Proc. 2017-53). See
What Is Equivalency Determination, supra note 100; see also Adler & Petit, supra
note 103.
105. Rev. Proc. 92-94, 1992-2 CB 507 (superseded by Rev. Proc. 2017-53). See
What Is Equivalency Determination, supra note 100; see also Adler & Petit, supra
note 103.
106. See supra Section I.C.
107. See generally BLAZEK, supra note 17, at 485 (“[S]eeking the appropriate
information described in the preceding subsection from a foreign organization is not
so simple and is often troublesome due to language, currency, and legal differences.
Because of these difficulties, a private foundation will sometimes find it more
comfortable to treat such foreign grantees as expenditure responsibility grants to
avoid unexpected results.”).
108. Id.
109. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(a)(1) (2015); IRM 7.27.19 (Feb. 22,1999).
110. Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (2015).
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expenditure responsibility looks to the charitable nature of the
specific activities that are being funded with exempt dollars.111
The expenditure responsibility requirements are laid out in 26
U.S.C. § 4945.112 In order to satisfy the expenditure responsibility
requirements, foundations must adhere to a variety of rules that
govern how they can make each expenditure responsibility grant to
help ensure that grant funds will be used for charitable activities only.
The generally accepted legal interpretation of the statute provides
that a foundation must:113
1. Conduct a pre-grant inquiry to ensure that a grantee organization
is capable of adhering to the expenditure responsibility restrictions
on grant funds;114
2. Require a written grant proposal and written grant agreement
that documents permissible and restricted uses for grant funds; 115
3. Meet a series of reporting requirements to document proper use
of grant funds;116 and
4. Disclose grant information annually to the IRS through the
foundation’s tax filings.117
5. If the grantee fails to adhere to the expenditure responsibility
requirements, the foundation must take action to remedy the misuse
of funds.118

In sum, these requirements are generally interpreted to be quite
arduous and require a high level of specificity from the grantee, both
111. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 , BLUEBOOK 3; SANDERS,
supra note 22, at 102.
112. See Appendix A for the full statute.
113. E.g., Expenditure Responsibility Rules for Private Foundations, LEARN
FOUNDATION
LAW,
http://learnfoundationlaw.org/transcript/expenditureresponsibility-rules-for-private-foundations-course-transcript/
[https://perma.cc/L6XA-5Q3Z]; see also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-80 to
11-89; Robert Wexler, Expenditure Responsibility—A Primer and Ten Puzzling
Problems, ADLER & COLVIN (Sept. 2010), https://www.adlercolvin.com/wpcontent/themes/adlercolvin/pdf/Expenditure-Responsibility-A-Primer-and-TenPuzzling-Problems.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8NM-LZV5].
114. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4945-5(b)(2) (2015).
115. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4945-5(b)(3) (2015).
116. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4945-5(c) (2015).
117. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4945-5(d) (2015).
118. See Wexler, supra note 113; see also Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4945-5(e) (2015); HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-90; Expenditure
Responsibility Rules for Private Foundations, supra note 113.
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of which require time and capacity.119 The next few paragraphs will
explore each of these five requirements in greater depth.

1. Pre-Grant Inquiry
A pre-grant inquiry (“PGI”) is required under expenditure
responsibility in order to ensure that the recipient organization is—to
the best of the foundation’s judgment—able to adhere to the terms of
the grant agreement. This determination is based upon a reasonable
person standard; in other words, the depth of a PGI must be what a
reasonable person would consider appropriate given the
circumstances.120 Some factors that can be considered to determine
what is reasonable include the size of the grantee organization, the
size of the grant, the type of activities in which they are involved, the
length of time that the foundation has known the organization, and
the amount of experience of the organization in managing
expenditure responsibility grants in the past.121 Though, in some
cases, past experience of the grantee organization can alone be
considered sufficient to fulfill the PGI requirements without any
further inquiry, most foundations conduct their own PGIs for each
expenditure responsibility grant. 122 An expenditure responsibility
grant can be made to a new organization, as long as foundation
leadership is sufficiently confident, based on the PGI, that the grantee
organization is capable of managing—and will comply with—the
expenditure responsibility requirements.123

2. Written Grant Proposal and Written Grant Agreement
A second requirement under expenditure responsibility is that of
written grant proposals and agreements.124 The written proposal
submitted by the grantee to the foundation must include the purpose

119. E.g., Donald Vacin, Guidelines for Foundation Administration Under the Tax
Reform Act, 52 TAXES 277, 293 (1974) (“[T]he requirements for exercising

expenditure responsibility are onerous, and failure to meet them can subject the
Foundation and its managers to the section 4945 penalties.”).
120. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(2) (2015) (observing
that the PGI will “vary from case to case depending upon the size and purpose of the
grant,” as well as the grant term and the organization’s prior experience with
expenditure responsibility requirements); HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-82
(noting that the PGI “should be complete enough to meet the reasonable-person
standard that the grant will be used for the proper purposes”).
121. E.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-82.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 11-83.
124. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(3) (2015).
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of the grant; the promise to repay unspent funds; and a commitment
to submit annual reports, record expenditures, and to use funds only
for acceptable, charitable purposes.125 An expenditure responsibility
grant cannot be used to cover the expenses for certain prohibited
activities, including lobbying, capital equipment purchases,126 or
grants to individuals127; therefore, if the organization proposes to
conduct prohibited activities, the proposal must also specify how
those activities are being funded by sources other than the
expenditure responsibility grant.128 Ultimately, the proposal can then
serve as the basis for what must be a signed grant agreement between
the grantee organization and the foundation.

3. Reporting Requirements
Expenditure responsibility also requires the grantee to write a
financial and narrative report at the end of every grant term.129 The
narrative report must explain how grant funds were applied towards
specific projects or efforts, in a manner sufficient to confirm that
funds were not spent on any prohibited expenditures.130 In addition,
the narrative report must describe how the organization made
progress towards the objectives outlined in the original proposal;
though it is acceptable if the final activities do not align exactly with
the initial proposal, the activities conducted must remain in alignment
with the spirit of the original proposal and not attribute the funding of

125. E.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-83 to 11-84.
126. In truth, this is actually a little more complicated. Capital equipment can
actually be purchased with funds from an ER grant, as long as the equipment is used
for approved purposes (e.g., non-lobbying activities). In order to ensure that the
equipment is being used in the appropriate manner, grantees must report on the
equipment for at least two years, and perhaps longer if it is unclear whether the
equipment might be used to help further lobbying activities in the future. Given this
reporting requirement, most foundations choose not to fund any capital purchases
above a de minimis threshold with funds that come with ER restrictions. See Grants
to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(2) (2015).
127. See Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(e) (2015).
128. See 26 C.F.R. Sxn 53.4945 (b)(3)(iv).
129. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(1) (2015).
130. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-86 (“[T]he regulations generally
require that the reports show the use of the funds, compliance with the terms of the
grant, and the progress made by the grantee toward achieving the purposes for which
the grant was made.”). Referring back to a more detailed description of a project
provided in a proposal can be sufficient, as long as implementation mirrored the
proposal. Id.
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any prohibited activities to the expenditure responsibility grant.131
Similarly, the financial reports must outline how grant funds were
spent as a way to ensure that no funds were used for lobbying or
other prohibited expenditures, as demonstrated in the sample report
in Appendix B.132 A financial report must be submitted at the end of
any fiscal period in which a grantee receives expenditure
responsibility funds from a foundation.133 Therefore, if a grant spans
multiple fiscal years, the grantee organization must submit a financial
report at the end of each fiscal year, as well as at the end of the
project when the grantee has expended all funds.134 The foundation
can request or mandate further narrative and/or financial reporting if
included in the signed grant agreement.135 If grant funds remain
following the completion of the agreed-upon grant activities, the
grantee organization must continue to submit reports either until all
funds are expended or any funds remaining are returned, as a way to
confirm that funds were expended for acceptable purposes only.136

4. Disclosure of Grant Information
The final expenditure responsibility requirements cover mandatory
disclosure to the IRS.137 As with all grants, foundations are obligated
to disclose to the IRS any expenditure responsibility grants they make
each year in their annual tax filings; in addition, a foundation must
have all related documentation on-file, ready to be accessed in case of
audit.138 The IRS tends to interpret this requirement strictly.139

131. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-90 (“[A] diversion of grant funds
involves more than merely using the funds for a purpose different from that indicated
in the grant’s original budget projection; the use must actually be inconsistent with
the original purposes of the grant as described in the grant agreement.”).
132. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(1) (2015). See
Appendix B for a sample financial report.
133. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-86.
134. See id.
135. 26 C.F.R. Sxn 53.4945 (c)(1); Adler & Petit, supra note 103.
136. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(1) (2015).
137. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(d)(1) (2015).
138. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(d)(3) (2015); see also HILL
& MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-87, 11-89.
139. E.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-88 to 11-89 (explaining that even
corrected tax returns sometimes are not considered sufficient to be in compliance
with the expenditure responsibility disclosure requirements).
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5. Taking Action to Remedy the Misuse of Funds
If a foundation fails to adhere to the expenditure responsibility
standards, there are a series of potential penalties with varying levels
of severity. Generally, any grant for which the foundation does not
meet the requirements will be treated as a taxable expenditure.140
Excise taxes will then be charged to the foundation managers, as a
way of increasing individual accountability.141 If the failure to comply
with expenditure responsibility requirements continues significantly
over time, the IRS can revoke a foundation’s tax-exempt status.142
Despite this responsibility, the provision of an expenditure
responsibility grant does not mean that a foundation becomes
responsible for the grantee’s every action.143 It is the expectation that
a foundation will exercise its judgment about when it is or is not
appropriate to make an expenditure responsibility grant, conduct an
appropriate level of due diligence, and make its best effort to ensure
compliance with the relevant code and regulations. As long as the
foundation made a reasonable determination that the grantee would
adhere to the expenditure responsibility requirements, a foundation is
not the “insurer of the activity of the organization to which it makes a
grant.”144 A foundation is allowed to accept statements made in
reports as true, unless it has reason to doubt their authenticity.145 If
the grantee fails to live up to all of the requirements—such as failing
to submit a required report or failing to return funds spent for
unacceptable purposes under the expenditure responsibility
framework—the foundation will not be penalized as long as the
140. See Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); Grants to
Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(e) (2015).
141. See Taxes on Taxable Expenditures, 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014).
142. See How to Lose Your Tax Exempt Status (Without Really Trying), IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/How%20to%20Lose%20Your%20Tax%20Exempt%20Status.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3NCS-SRXM].
143. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (2015) (clarifying
that foundations are not “an insurer of the activity of the organization to which it
makes a grant”); S. Rep. No. 91-552, at 2078 (1969) (noting that expenditure
responsibility does not make a “granting foundation an insurer of the activity of the
organization to which it makes a grant, so long as it uses reasonable efforts and
establishes adequate procedures so that the funds will be used for proper charitable
purposes”).
144. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(1) (2015); S. Rep. No.
91-552, at 2078 (1969).
145. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-87 (“[T]he grantor private
Foundation generally may rely on the reports submitted by a grantee and is not
required to conduct any independent verification of the grantees reports unless it has
reason to doubt their accuracy or reliability.”).
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foundation itself takes “reasonable and appropriate” remedial steps,
such as disclosing the grant to the IRS and withholding any future
payments or grants to the organization until they have come fully into
compliance with the expenditure responsibility requirements.146
The expenditure responsibility requirements generally are
interpreted to be arduous and present risk, for either general or
project support grants.147 Given the potential negative impact that
failing to adhere to the expenditure responsibility requirements can
create for a foundation, foundation managers and counsel tend to
interpret the requirements strictly, in a risk-averse manner, in order
to ensure compliance with the law, thereby avoiding potential
sanctions or loss of tax-exempt status.148 As a result, these codes and
regulations affect foundation behavior by creating a number of
disincentives that were not necessarily the intent of the law and
related regulations; this includes an increased reliance on lawyers,
given the complexity of the law and the associated risks, and a general
avoidance of funding non-501(c)(3) organizations, small grants, or
new organizations altogether.149 This interpretation of the limitations
and burdens of the expenditure responsibility requirements is further
explored and dissected in the coming sections.
II. FOUNDATION RELUCTANCE TO MAKE GENERAL SUPPORT
GRANTS WHILE OPERATING UNDER EXPENDITURE
RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
The regulations governing expenditure responsibility expressly
state that it is possible to make a general support grant within the
confines of expenditure responsibility,150 yet legal interpretation and
foundation practice consistently emphasize the use of project grants
alone when working under the expenditure responsibility
requirements.151 Section II.A reviews the governing portion of the

146. See id. But see SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
Cong., DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND CONTINUING LEGAL
TREATMENT OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 32 (Comm. Print 1983)
(specifying that expenditure responsibility “requires grant-making foundations to
assume the responsibility that their grantees will use their grants properly”);
Labovitz, supra note 46, at 83.
147. See infra Section II.B.
148. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(e) (2015).
149. E.g., Labovitz, supra note 46, at 82; SANDERS, supra note 22, at 1268.
150. See Grants to Organizations, 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(3) (2015).
151. E.g., Expenditure Responsibility Rules for Private Foundations, supra note
113.
AND MEANS, 98th
ISSUES IN THE TAX
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U.S. Tax Code,152 the C.F.R.,153 the I.R.M.,154 and the related
legislative history, to explain the ways in which general support grants
seem to be an acceptable option under the expenditure responsibility
requirements. Section II.B explores foundation practice as it relates
to expenditure responsibility implementation, and then Section II.C
reviews the policy debate about whether the use of general support
should or should not increase.
A. The United States Code, Code of Federal Regulations, and
the Internal Revenue Manual: The Explicit Mention of
“General Support”
Section 4945 of United States Code Title 26 addresses expenditure
responsibility.155 Its language is fairly general and sufficiently vague,
framing expenditure responsibility as a positive exception to the rules
governing the taxation of foundation expenditures to non-exempt
organizations.156 The only requirements are that a foundation is
obligated “(1) to see that the grant is spent solely for the purpose for
which [it is] made, (2) to obtain full and complete reports from the
grantee on how the funds are spent, and (3) to make full and detailed
reports with respect to such expenditures to the Secretary.”157 There
is no mention of the types of grants that foundations can or cannot
make while maintaining compliance with these requirements; in other
words, while this portion of the Code does not state affirmatively that
general support grants are allowed, neither does it state that general
support grants are prohibited.
A more nuanced and interesting picture of what expenditure
responsibility actually means only begins to form when examining the
relevant portion of the C.F.R.: 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5. Where the U.S.
Code remains vague, the C.F.R. begins to provide more specifics. For
example, it is in this part of the Code that many of the specific

152. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 4940– 4948 (2014).
153. See generally Purposes 1 C.F.R. § 301.2 (2010).
154. A reference guide for tax authorities. See generally IRM 1.1.1.1 (June 2,
2015).
155. Expenditure responsibility was first introduced in The Tax Reform Act of
1969, a law that perhaps “has done more to influence modern philanthropy” than any
other law before or since. See Peter Frumkin, The Ironies of Foundation Regulation,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 5, 2004), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/TheIronies-of-Foundation/164851?cid=cpfd_home [https://perma.cc/UPW3-5FPH]. See
also HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 1 (“[T]he 1969 tax reform was the biggest public
policy change ever undertaken with regard to America’s nonprofit Foundations.”).
156. See 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014).
157. Id. § 4945(h)(1)-(3).
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expenditure responsibility requirements are first introduced, such as
the requirements for a pre-grant inquiry, written and signed grant
agreement, and to repay any unused or misused funds; in addition,
this section of the C.F.R. further elaborates on the reporting
requirements.158
Most importantly, general support is explicitly mentioned in the
C.F.R.: the grant agreement:
must also clearly specify the purposes of the grant. Such purposes
may include contributing for capital endowment, for the purchase of
capital equipment, or for general support provided that neither the
grants nor the income therefrom may be used for purposes other
than those described in section 170(c)(2)(B).159

Unfortunately, despite this express mention of general support, no
further guidance is provided in the C.F.R. about how a foundation
might make a general support grant under expenditure
responsibility.160 The same holds true for the I.R.M., in which certain
details are further delineated regarding how expenditure
responsibility grants might look, yet further guidance is not provided
about how general support grants might be made.161
The policy purposes behind expenditure responsibility also support
the idea that general support is allowed within the confines of
expenditure responsibility. The legislative history uncovers that the
purpose of expenditure responsibility is to ensure that funds donated
to foreign organizations are used to promote the public good, just as
funds donated to 501(c)(3) organizations or their equivalents would
be limited.162 As stated in the C.F.R., expenditure responsibility is
intended to “impose[] restrictions on the use of the grant substantially
equivalent to the limitations imposed on a domestic private
foundation under section 4945(d),” but not to go any further.163 The
key is to balance flexibility with responsibility.164 General support
grants are allowed to public charities and their equivalents; therefore,

158. See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2015).
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See IRM7.27.19.3.11, 6.1, 6.7 (Feb. 22, 1999).
162. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 1648 (1969) (observing that expenditure
responsibility intends “to prevent self-dealing between the foundations and their
substantial contributors, to require the distribution of income for charitable purposes,
to limit their holdings of private businesses, to give assurance that their activities are
restricted as provided by the exemption provisions of the tax laws, and to be sure that
investments of these organizations are not jeopardized by financial speculation.”).
163. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(5) (2015).
164. See H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 1680 (1969).
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in order to maintain this equity and balance, Congress likely intended
that they be allowed in the expenditure responsibility context as
well.165
The way that expenditure responsibility is framed—as an exception
to otherwise taxable expenditures—also seems to promote the notion
that the requirements should have some associated flexibility.166 By
consequence, expenditure responsibility appears to be an avenue for
providing greater breadth and flexibility for foundations in their grant
making. The expenditure responsibility requirements also inherently
afford a significant level of discretion to foundations.167 Rather than
focusing on what a grantee must do, the expenditure responsibility
requirements provide clarity about what a grantee must not do.168
The prohibitions limit lobbying and other political activity, capital
equipment purchases and individual grant making; beyond that,
grantees are simply required to submit “full and complete” reports
and foundations are expected merely to use “reasonable efforts” and
“adequate procedures” to ensure compliance.169 A seemingly low
standard of obligation,170 this leaves latitude for foundations to
determine that they have enough trust with grantees and have
provided those grantees with sufficient guidance that they can provide
general support and still remain confident that the grantee will not
use the funds for prohibited expenditures.
Another piece of evidence that supports the notion that Congress
did not intend to limit general support within the expenditure
responsibility context is that the grantee is not required to adhere
strictly to the grant proposal during implementation. As long as the
grantee avoids prohibited expenditures, it is well-established that the
grantee will be considered in compliance with expenditure
responsibility requirements if the purposes for which they expend the
grant funds are within the spirit of the original proposal.171 In other

165. See id.
166. See 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d)(4)(B) (2014).
167. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(1)(i)–(iii) (2015); 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014);
IRM 7.27.19.6.5 (Feb. 22, 1999).
168. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)–(e) (2015); IRM 7.27.19.6.14.1–14.2 (Feb.
22, 1999).
169. See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)–(e) (2015); IRM 7.27.19.6.14.1–14.2 (Feb. 22,
1999).
170. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-782, at 7 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, at 2392 (noting that expenditure responsibility is only supposed to prohibit the
narrow circumstance of lobbying on proposed legislation; it is “not intended to
prevent the examination of broad social, economic, or similar problems”).
171. See IRM 7.27.19.6.14.1. (Feb. 22, 1999).

1324

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

words, the grantee need not implement exactly the activities as
outlined in the original proposal.172 Specifically, the I.R.M. states:
The diversion of grant funds by a grantee organization to any use
not in furtherance of a purpose specified in the grant may result in
the diverted portion of the grant being a taxable expenditure under
IRC 4945(d)(4). However, the mere use of grant funds for activities
not planned in the original budget is not treated as a diversion. The
use of the grant funds must actually be inconsistent with the original
purposes of the grant as described in the grant agreement.173

This implies that a grantee can have some flexibility in their
programmatic implementation of an expenditure responsibility grant,
as long as they are sure to avoid the short list of prohibited
expenditures—a notion aligned with the spirit of general support
grant making.
B. Foundation Practice
Despite the express mention of “general support” in the C.F.R. and
I.R.M., expenditure responsibility involves a series of requirements
that foundation managers and counsel—who are primarily concerned
with protecting a foundation’s tax-exempt status—interpret strictly
and, remarkably consistently, not to allow that form of grant
making.174 Under expenditure responsibility, a foundation must be
able to ensure that a grantee organization spends grant funds solely
on charitable purposes, and does not spend grant funds on lobbying
activities, political activities, or for several other forms of
inappropriate expenditures.175 The most natural way to ensure that
these requirements are met is to earmark funds for particular
purposes and provide very specific, restricted funding—or project
grants—to organizations.176 This earmarking not only contrasts
directly with the unrestricted nature and purpose of general support,
but conflicts with what is needed to remain within the general support

172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58. See also generally Vacin,
supra note 119; Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deduction for Charitable Contributions: Domestic
Activities, Foreign Activities, or None of the Above , 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (2011);
NORTON, supra note 17; JONATHON R. MOORE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL PHILANTHROPY 67–68 (2010); BLAZEK, supra note 17; JODY BLAZEK
& BRUCE R. HOPKINS, PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS: TAX LAW AND COMPLIANCE (2014);
Adler & Petit, supra note 103; Wexler, supra note 113.
175. See 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(b)(3)(iv) (2015); 26 U.S.C. § 4945(d)(4) (2014).
176. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58.
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safe harbor.177 Given that failing to adhere to these regulations and
guidelines can result in a series of excise taxes at best and loss of tax
exemption at worst, it is critical that private foundations stay within
the boundaries of the law.178 Thus, foundation managers and legal
counsel advise a safe approach: that only project grants be made
under the expenditure responsibility framework.179
Furthermore, the requirements outlined in the expenditure
responsibility regulations are generally perceived to work against the
spirit of relinquishing control and providing flexible funds to grantees
through general support. In fact, some foundations interpret these
requirements so strictly that many actually avoid making expenditure
responsibility grants as institutional policy.180 Michael Sanders, a
leading lawyer on taxation of exempt organizations, suggests in his
book Joint Ventures Involving Tax-Exempt Organizations that, “[t]o
avoid the administrative burden imposed by these special
requirements for grants to foreign private foundations, it is
recommended that the foundation consider adopting a general policy
that grants are to be made solely to public charities or their
equivalents.”181 When expenditure responsibility grants are made,
Sanders continues, they require “careful, case-by-case legal
review.”182
Though this strict interpretation does reduce risk for a foundation,
general support grants offer such great value for a wide array of
organizations that additional risk may be justified for some
foundations.183 The next section explores the reasons why a more
flexible interpretation of the expenditure responsibility requirements
is not only possible, but should be adopted, even while recognizing
the legitimate risk-averse instincts that many foundations and legal
practitioners currently exercise.

177. IRM 7.27.19.3.9 (Feb. 22, 1999).
178. See IRM 7.27.19.2 (Feb. 22, 1999); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(2)–(3) (2015); see
also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-81 (“[S]trict compliance with the
expenditure responsibility requirements [] is crucial.”).
179. See IRM 7.27.19.2 (Feb. 22, 1999); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(2)–(3) (2015); see
also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-81.
180. See SANDERS, supra note 22, at 1268–69.
181. Id. at 1268.
182. Id.
183. Recall the earlier list of domestic organizations—such as neighborhood
organizations or hospitals—as well as all foreign organizations who do charitable
work but who may not meet the distribution requirements to receive an equivalency
determination. See supra Section I.C.
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C. The Benefits and Importance of Providing General Support
Grants: Why Foundations and the IRS Should Interpret
Expenditure Responsibility Requirements to Allow General
Support Grant Making
In this next section, this Note provides an overview of the reasons
foundations should be increasing their use of general support grants,
as well as a review of arguments to the contrary.

1. General Support Is Better for Organizations, Better for
Innovation, and Better for Society
There is increasing agreement that general support is better for
grantee organizations, better for innovation, and ultimately better for
the public good than project support.184 In addition to the text of the
regulations and the legislative intent, there are a variety of policies
that make it prudent to allow an interpretation of the expenditure
responsibility requirements that includes an option for general
support grants. Grantee organizations are much closer to the fields
they support, and are much more knowledgeable about the intricacies
of the issues they support than most funders.185 Combined with the
reality that the fields in which charitable organizations work are often
complex and ever-changing, for grantees to be effective they require
some modicum of control over how to adjust funds throughout the
course of project implementation.186 Providing grantees that space to
determine how funds are spent allows grantee organizations to adjust
to realities on the ground and switch course mid-stream when
necessary in order to foster greater impact and promote better
results.187
In a similar vein, funders who take a longer-term view of the
change they are trying to foster in society recognize the importance of
strong civil society actors. General support helps to strengthen
organizations.188 By allowing the grantee the flexibility to fund a key
184. See, e.g., Alex Daniels, Few Foundations Offer Grants to Deal with the
Unexpected, OPEN ROAD ALLIANCE (Feb. 1, 2016), http://openroadalliance.org/fewfoundations-offer-grants-to-deal-with-the-unexpected/
[https://perma.cc/FR8TZEQ5]; MCCRAY, supra note 10, at 7; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the
Capacity of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; The Beauty of the General Support
Grant, supra note 10.
185. See, e.g., The Beauty of the General Support Grant, supra note 10.
186. See Supporting Grantee Capacity: Strengthening Effectiveness Together ,
supra note 92, at 17–18.
187. See id.
188. See, e.g., General Operating Support (or Unrestricted) Grants, supra note 12;
MCCRAY, supra note 10, at 7; Unrestricted Core Support: Strengthening the Capacity
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project, the use of general operating costs (including training for
staff), or even the flexibility to shift funds around when new donors
are acquired, general support funds can play a key role in helping
organizations to strengthen their overall capacity and effectiveness.189
By limiting the types of grants that organizations can receive under
expenditure responsibility rules, the IRS would be working against its
own stated interests—to allow charitable giving, but to do so in a way
that is most impactful and responsible given the non-taxable nature of
the funds.190
It is also important to revisit some of the important aspects of
foundation contributions outlined earlier; specifically, foundations
play a key role in our society as incubators and experimenters,
providers of services that the government cannot or chooses not to
provide, as well as key contributors to civil discourse.191 By arming
foundations with the ability to provide the most effective support
possible to grantees, the positive impact that foundations can have on
our domestic and global society is only increased. Unfortunately,
expenditure responsibility has generally had the opposite effect:
pushing foundations to fund pre-existing, stable NGOs that have been
around for a long time, rather than the innovative, new, emerging
organizations with fresh ideas.192 Specifically,
the E[xpenditure] R[esponsibility] provision has been criticized as
being unduly burdensome, especially for small foundations which
lack administrative capacity to fulfill these requirements. It is said
that it is easier for large foundations to supervise a few large grants
rather than to orchestrate the paperwork on a number of small
grants. E[xpenditure] R[esponsibility] is said to encourage routine,
status quo grants.193

of Our Nonprofit Sector, supra note 12; The Beauty of the General Support Grant,
supra note 10.
189. See Supporting Grantee Capacity: Strengthening Effectiveness Together ,
supra note 92, at 10–11.
190. See supra Section II.A.
191. See supra Section I.A.
192. See Labovitz, supra note 46, at 84 (“[T]he provision is adversely affecting new
initiatives, especially involving poor, ghetto, and minority groups.”); MOORE, supra
note 174, at 67–68.
193. SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
98th Cong., DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND CONTINUING LEGAL ISSUES IN THE TAX
TREATMENT OF PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 50 (Comm. Print 1983).
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In other words, expenditure responsibility has “provided a rationale
for the continuance of conservative grant-making practices”—a
reality that certainly needs to be changed, particularly given changes
in the global context since the passage of this law.194

2. The Use of the Term “General Support” Matters
The ability to use the framework and language of “general
support” is also important. Though similar flexibility and autonomy
can be provided to grantees through a project support grant,
foundations legally can jump in to influence grantee activities at any
point; with general support, the foundation is obligated to honor the
grantee’s autonomy (unless the foundation is willing to risk legal
exposure by not remaining within the general support safe harbor).
The terminology holds value: “general support” as a phrase means
something specific, and the more that this term—a proxy for the
concepts of flexible funding, grantee autonomy, and an awareness and
leveling of the power dynamic between funder and grantee—can be
utilized, the better.

3. The Policy Concerns Laid Out by Lawmakers Are Better
Addressed by Interpreting Expenditure Responsibility to
Allow for General Support Grants
Despite the supporting factors noted above, the legislative history
also reflects skepticism among some lawmakers of more flexible grant
making approaches.195 However, providing greater autonomy to
grantees more effectively counters any mistrust in foundations than
does limiting the discretion that foundations can pass on to grantee
organizations: Grantees are much closer than foundations to the
issues on which they engage and the communities they support, which
increases grantee responsiveness and accountability to the public due
both to their proximity to the field and their reliance on donations as
compared to foundations.
In a similar manner, the Tax Reform Act sought to increase the
amount of funds that were available for the public good, rather than
utilized for self-aggrandizement or foundation overhead costs.196

194. Labovitz, supra note 46, at 78–79.
195. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 1679 (1969); S. Rep. No. 91-552, at
2040–41 (1969).
196. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 91ST CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 3–4 (Comm. Print
1970); HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 172.
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However, both the actual and perceived strict nature of the
expenditure responsibility requirements has resulted in “increased
expenses for legal services and a greater reliance on counsel,” making
large foundations with high overhead more viable than smaller
foundations with lower overhead, and running counter to Congress’
stated purpose.197 Therefore, by allowing and even clarifying the
more flexible potential for expenditure responsibility, the impact of
the law and regulations can become more in-line with the stated
intention.

4. Developments in Practice Suggest General Momentum
Towards Greater Numbers of General Support Grants
Over time, the IRS regulations have taken on a life of their own.
Foundation practice has evolved and certain practices have become
the understood, de facto approach even if not expressly stated. For
example, the expenditure responsibility regulations require that
grantees “establish separate accounts” for funds that have
expenditure responsibility requirements tied to them.198 However,
given the challenges (such as high levels of bureaucracy or unwanted
government attention) and expense that some organizations face in
opening new accounts, it has become standard practice that a
foundation will consider the maintenance of separate accounting by
the recipient organization sufficient to meet this requirement.199
The IRS has also relaxed a series of regulations regarding grant
making activity in a manner that indicates a loosening of the
restrictions on foundation activity generally.200 This reduction in
scrutiny or skepticism of foundation activities aligns with and
potentially supports the allowance of more flexible interpretations of
the expenditure responsibility regulations. For example, over the past
two decades, the definition of “charitable” has been expanding in
nature, signaling that the IRS and even the American public prefer
that a wider array of activities be considered pursuant of the public
good and to receive the benefit of the charitable tax exemption.201

197. Labovitz, supra note 46, at 78, 82 (observing that expenditure responsibility
has “generated more foundation paperwork than any other provision of the Act). But
see id. at 79–80 (professing that the costs of initial implementation will subside over
time, as foundations “routinize” the process and establish procedures).
198. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5(c)(3) (2015) (emphasis added).
199. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58.
200. See SANDERS, supra note 22, at 296.
201. See id.
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This also indicates an increasing trust in the nonprofit sector, thereby
paralleling the notions that less heavy regulation is warranted.
A more recent example: the IRS has issued new regulations that
allow for greater investments in projects that both serve a charitable
purpose but that also present an opportunity for income for the
foundation.202 Particularly given the (earlier described) skepticism of
foundation wealth, this represents a clear departure from past
practice and regulation of foundations.
In all of these cases, these changes are for pragmatic reasons: the
IRS recognizes that when process meets practice, certain
requirements will have to be flexible. Given the importance of
general support grants—as well as their express mention in the
regulations covering expenditure responsibility—it is reasonable to
believe that the responsible provision of general support grants within
the expenditure responsibility requirements falls within this
category.203

5. Arguments Against Interpreting Expenditure Responsibility
Rules to Allow General Support Grants
On the other hand, there are a number of arguments for why the
IRS and foundations should not interpret or allow general support
grants when operating under the expenditure responsibility rules.
First and foremost is ensuring that tax-exempt funds be expended
for appropriate purposes: charitable activities.204 This takes on
particular importance when considering that expenditure
responsibility grants go to organizations that are not traditional public
charities: “In the abstract, this certainly appears reasonable. If
organizations are going to enjoy a favored legal status, then they must
contribute something toward the public interest in exchange for that
favored status.”205 Some lawmakers fear that subversive activities or

202. Alex Daniels, IRS Issues Rules Favorable to Foundations on ProgramInvestments, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://philanthropy.com/article/IRS-Rules-GiveFoundations/236225?cid=pt&utm_source=pt&utm_medium=en&elqTrackId=f48efb
37c4f441d1923feae533cfb90c&elq=3376f8d66578490dae3b2806fd377c9c&elqaid=8790
&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=2978 [https://perma.cc/FAW8-LD33].
203. While this may seem straightforward to some, recall that accepted foundation
practice is to provide only project support grants when funding under expenditure
responsibility requirements. See supra Section II.A.
204. See HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 48–49.
205. Id.

Related
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even terrorism will be funded with charitable dollars unless strict
enforcement exists.206
It is important to understand that this concern—as well as others,
stated in later portions of this section—often stems from, and is
exacerbated by, a mistrust of foundations. As Randall G. Holcombe,
a Professor of Economics at Florida State University, states well in his
book Writing Off Ideas:
the primary problem from a public policy standpoint is that
[f]oundation trustees have a tremendous amount of wealth at their
disposal that they can spend as they see fit. While they are charged
with acting in the public interest, they are accountable to nobody. 207

In fact, there is evidence from the legislative history of the
expenditure responsibility bill that, prior to the Tax Reform Act of
1969, there were insufficient rules in place to ensure that private
foundations were making grants to support exempt purposes only.208
Because of this, some lawmakers prefer that the government retains
strict control over the types of grants that foundations can make,
limiting the scope of discretion afforded to foundations.209 Though
the value of general support grants is that grantees, not foundations,
are ultimately afforded greater flexibility and autonomy in how they
utilize grant funds, foundations do receive an interim increase in
discretion when serving as the necessary intermediary in the
disbursement of grant funds: Foundations are afforded the
opportunity to determine for which organizations it is appropriate
and reasonable to provide an expenditure responsibility grant, as well
as when it is appropriate and reasonable to provide grantees with
flexibility through a general support grant.210
This lack of trust extends even further than just the assurance that
foundations fund exempt purposes only.211 As Holcombe states in
Writing Off Ideas,
206. See NORTON, supra note 17, at 52; SANDERS, supra note 22, at 1253.
207. HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 2.
208. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 1646–49 (1969) (exploring the ways in
which insufficient regulation has led to inappropriate activities by some
Foundations); see also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 41, at 11-78 to 11-92.
209. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-413 (1969).
210. Revisit the PGI requirements, described in 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (b)(2)
(2015), which explain each of the decision-making points for a foundation when
considering an expenditure responsibility grant. In these moments, foundations do
experience a temporary increase in autonomy and authority, as these decisions are
made at the discretion of foundation staff and/or trusted advisors.
211. In fact, this ongoing skepticism of foundations derives from a clear political
bent. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was the culmination of over a decade of inquiry
by two skeptical lawmakers who were disturbed by the potential impact that
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[there are] two reasons why foundations might warrant closer
scrutiny than other charitable organizations. First, they are often
established with the idea of providing more donor direction funds
than a typical charity, and second, the funds may be put to more
imaginative or unconventional uses, which naturally will raise the
question of the degree to which the public interest is served by the
[f]oundation.212

Though in some ways these are justifiable concerns, foundations
operate in a regulatory environment that ensures the use of taxexempt funds for charitable purposes only. Not only are there
requirements about what constitutes a charitable expenditure (which
includes the expenditure responsibility rules), but foundations also
have to adhere to strict annual disbursement requirements, board
membership requirements, anti-terrorism regulations, and a variety of
other features that, if circumvented, will result in excise taxes for both
the foundation itself and the individual trustees of the organization.213
In the case of expenditure responsibility grants, specifically, the IRM
expressly states that the purpose of expenditure responsibility is to
“impose restrictions which are substantially equivalent to the
limitations placed on domestic private foundations by IRC
4945(d).”214 Given the breadth and effectiveness of the restrictions in
place, it seems reasonable to balance potential risks and rewards in a
way that allows for greater flexibility to the ultimate grant
recipients.215 For example, in light of the global trend to restrict civil
society space, more and more organizations are being forced to
register as for-profit enterprises despite having a solely charitable
purpose in the eyes of U.S. tax law; this alone provides great impetus
to trust that the regulations currently in place allow foundations to

foundations could have on public discourse. It is no coincidence that this inquiry ran
in parallel with McCarthyism: a period in American history marked by general
skepticism and concern about subversive activities by liberal elites. Specifically,
lawmakers were disturbed at the impact that foundations could have over public
policy, and the 1969 Tax Reform Act was a clear response to this political influence.
Those same lawmakers were skeptical that foundations were working in the public
interest, and were able to argue that it was unfair for foundations to wield the level of
influence they were, given that the resources of most other actors seeking to engage
in public policy debate paled in comparison. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 91-413
(1969); S. Rep. No. 91-552 (1969); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-782 (1969), reprinted in
1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, at. 2392; GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1969, supra note 196, at 3; SANDERS, supra note 22, at 100–02.
212. HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 8.
213. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 4942, 4945 (2014).
214. IRM 7.27.19.6.9 (Feb. 22, 1999).
215. See, e.g., Frumkin, supra note 155.
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provide greater flexibility to international organizations where
appropriate.
The third main concern is the notion that tax exemption for
foundations makes foundation funds subsidized by taxpayers and,
therefore, public money. However, this is categorically untrue.
Foundations are not established to be agents of the state, and in fact
are intentionally designed to be able to tackle issues and challenges
that the government otherwise cannot or will not address.216 In
addition, foundation money is donated by private individuals, and tax
exemption is granted in exchange for dedicating the organization’s
efforts to public—rather than private—benefit.217 The State’s power
of regulation over foundations and other charitable organizations
should not be conflated with the decision-making authority of private
individuals in determining how foundation assets are spent: the State
has the power to regulate but, just as is true with private corporations,
individuals still retain decision-making authority.218
A related concern to this notion that tax-exempt dollars are funds
subsidized by the general public is a desire for those tax-exempt,
“publically subsidized” funds to remain within the United States, to
focus on fostering social progress domestically.219 Some lawmakers
fear that if expenditure responsibility rules were to relax, the funding
of foreign organizations would become so easy that foreign issues
would draw much-needed funds that would otherwise be applied
towards domestic issues.220 Though in some ways this concern cannot
be quelled for those who find this argument compelling, it has been
shown that the betterment of global welfare has important impacts
for domestic well-being as well, meaning funds spent on charitable
activities abroad do in fact offer domestic benefit.221
In response to all of these concerns, time has shown that
foundations work consistently in the public interest, and relatively
few abuses exist among modern foundations (if they ever existed at
all).222
As the Chronicle of Philanthropy has proclaimed:
“Foundations have grown into profoundly public institutions, open

216. See supra Section I.A.
217. See HOLCOMBE, supra note 25, at 49–50.
218. See EVELYN BRODY & JOHN TYLER, HOW PUBLIC IS
PHILANTHROPY? SEPARATING REALITY FROM MYTH 29, 34 (1st ed. 2009).
219. See Zolt, supra note 174, at 368.
220. See id. at 379.
221. See generally id. at 380.
222. See generally Frumkin, supra note 155.
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and transparent to all.”223 The purpose of foundation regulations was
to protect against self-dealing or private benefit from public tax
exemption; the unintended consequence of limiting grantee flexibility
is not necessary to achieve these goals. The drafters’ own language
can now be used against them: “although the tax preferences may
have been justified at the time of their inception, it is not clear that
they are needed or desirable in today’s economy.”224 Though perhaps
this clampdown on foundations was necessary in the late 1960s, the
rare misuse of funds by foundations means these requirements might
be outdated. Therefore, it is time to make clear that expenditure
responsibility requirements have room for flexibility, and that the IRS
will respect that discretionary space.
III. APPROACHES FOUNDATIONS CAN TAKE TO PROVIDE
GENERAL SUPPORT GRANTS WHILE OPERATING UNDER
EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
When a law is complicated or the lines it draws are indistinct, there
is a normal tendency to steer clear of any activity that involves the
risk of a violation. In the case of the foundation provisions, the
penumbra of the law reaches most of what foundations claim they
are or should be doing—innovative grants, seed money grants,
grants that will influence social policy. Relatively few foundations
have sufficiently sophisticated staffs—or a deep enough commitment
to these activities—to persevere when the legality of what they are
contemplating is in doubt. For many foundations, the 1969 law is a
refuge; it provides a rationale for continuing their traditionally
conservative activities despite the urgings of leaders in the field to
become more venturesome and bold.225

Despite the lack of particular guidance in the U.S. Code and the
C.F.R., and foundations’ risk-averse approach to grant making under
expenditure responsibility, the law does affirmatively state that
general support is possible under expenditure responsibility.226
Therefore, there must be a way for foundations to remain within the
expenditure responsibility requirements while also providing grantees
with much-needed flexibility through general support grant making.
Part III explores potential approaches to providing general support
while adhering to the expenditure responsibility requirements,

223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, at 1653 (1969).
Labovitz, supra note 46, at 80.
26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2015); see IRM 7.27.19.3.11, 6.1, 6.7 (Feb. 22, 1999).
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followed by a recommendation for clarifying updates to the C.F.R.
and I.R.M. that confirm the acceptability of making general support
grants under expenditure responsibility.
A. Possibilities Under the Existing Legal Framework
In order to develop potential approaches to general support grant
making under expenditure responsibility, it is important to remember
two things: the purposes for making a general support grant rather
than a project support grant, and the mechanics of the general
support safe harbor. Ultimately, a general support grant allows the
grantee to remain in control of how funds are spent, allowing for
greater flexibility and responsiveness in implementation of their
strategy that can result in greater impact and a stronger organization.
The key element of a general support grant is that funds are not (in
reality or based on perception) earmarked by the foundation for any
particular activities or outcomes. Avoiding earmarking funds for
particular purposes is necessary in order to remain safely within the
general support safe harbor. With this in mind, this Note suggests
three main ways that a foundation could make a general support
grant under the existing expenditure responsibility requirements. The
following recommendations are intended to apply to international
organizations that lack equivalency determination227 yet are
charitable in nature.

1. Potential Approach 1: Removing the Need for the General
Support Safe Harbor
The first approach examines and questions the underlying necessity
of the general support safe harbor. The protection provided by this
safe harbor is only necessary when a grantee conducts any amount of
lobbying or other prohibited activities228; if, at the end of a grant
term, the organization conducted no lobbying or other prohibited
activities, attaining the general support safe harbor is a moot point.
Therefore, foundation staff should feel comfortable providing an
expenditure responsibility general support grant to an organization
that the foundation knows only conducts charitable activities and will
not conduct any lobbying or other prohibited activities. This trust can
be developed through the PGI process, and confirmed in the written
grant agreement required by expenditure responsibility rules. The

227. Recall the many reasons an organization may lack equivalency determination.

See supra Section I.C.
228. See supra Section I.C.2.

1336

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

requisite financial reporting can be satisfied with reports that remain
consistent with the standard interpretation of general support
reporting requirements: that expenditures not be attributed to any
particular funding sources in order to avoid the appearance of
earmarking. Because—as both the proposal and final reports
confirm—no prohibited activities were conducted by the grantee, it is
unnecessary to clarify which activities were funded with the
expenditure responsibility funds: all expenditures would be
considered acceptable by the IRS.
This option is the most
straightforward and presents little risk for foundations, but will only
be possible in a limited number of circumstances.

2. Potential Approach 2: Bifurcated Budgets
A second potential approach to general support grant making
within the confines of expenditure responsibility acknowledges the
fungible nature of an organization’s funds. In fact, the IRS itself
acknowledges the fungible nature of assets in the creation of the
general support safe harbor.229 To extrapolate this further: If, during
the proposal stage of a general support grant, an organization submits
a projected budget that includes certain prohibited activities, the
grantee can be asked to bifurcate the budget. If the organization can
show that the total funds projected to be spent on non-prohibited
activities is higher than the amount of the potential grant, a general
support grant should be considered possible.
After clear
conversations and perhaps training on prohibited expenditures, the
required PGI can be used to establish sufficient trust regarding an
organization’s understanding of prohibited uses for the grant funds
and that funds used for prohibited expenditures will need to be
returned. Of course, this understanding will be confirmed in the
mandatory written grant agreement.
At the same time, the
foundation retains the general support safe harbor because they are
not earmarking funds for particular purposes: the grantee has full
control to determine how funds are spent within the broad category
of appropriate, charitable expenditures. If a foundation desires to
reduce risk in this scenario a little further, it might then ask for the
final financial reports to show how the prohibited expenditures were
covered by funds other than those of the expenditure responsibility
grant. That way, the foundation can avoid both earmarking funds at
the beginning of the grant and the perception of having earmarked
funds through the request of attribution in the final reports. It is
229. See supra Section I.B.2.
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important to note that this approach is not novel, and is often used in
the project support context;230 however, it seems possible to replicate
this in the general support context as well.
This potential approach becomes complicated if a significant
portion of the organization’s projected expenditures consist of
prohibited activities or non-charitable expenditures. In those cases,
earmarking by the foundation could be considered to have occurred
by default. For example, if an organization is planning to run ten
projects of roughly equivalent budget sizes, but nine of them are
lobbying-based and only one is not, taking this approach would, in
effect, mirror a foundation earmarking funds for that particular
project (in this case, a mere ten percent of possible activities). This
clearly goes against the spirit of general support grant making, and
would not warrant valid application of the general support safe
harbor.
Therefore, a foundation must exercise discretion in
determining when taking this approach would still provide sufficient
flexibility and decision-making authority to the grantee. Though not
current law, the IRS might consider extending the de minimis
exception relevant to registered 501(c)(3) public charities or
delineating alternative proportions or percentages—such as a fifteen
percent maximum in lobbying or other prohibited expenditures—that
would allow foundations to provide general support through this
method with more confidence.
This percentage approach is
strengthened when one considers that this same approach is used in
other aspects of foundation law: a threshold test is used to determine
whether an organization is eligible to become a 501(c)(3) nonprofit.231 Appendices C, D, and E illustrate sample expenditure
responsibility proposals and reports that align with this potential
approach.232

3. Potential Approach 3: De-Linking Funds from Specific
Project Activities or the All/But Approach
A third potential approach to making a general support grant
within the confines of current expenditure responsibility requirements
utilizes a variation on the negotiated general support approach, and
goes a step further than the second approach outlined above. Recall
that with negotiated general support, a foundation can make it clear
what they do want a grantee organization to do throughout the grant

230. Interview with Nicole Campbell, supra note 58.
231. See Knowledge Base, supra note 7.
232. See Appendices C–E.
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term but, by de-linking the use of the grant funds from helping to
further those particular projects or outcomes, the foundation stops
short of tying the funds to particular purposes and can remain within
the spirit of general support grant making while also retaining the
general support safe harbor.233 A series of possibilities for general
support grant making under expenditure responsibility become
possible if a foundation takes the negotiated general support
approach and inverts it: rather than telling an organization what they
should do, foundations could explain merely what they cannot do.
This way, foundations could ensure that potential general support
grantees retain a high level of control over how funds are spent, yet
also be sure that activities include “everything except” or “all but”
prohibited expenditures.
This departs from the control and
earmarking to particular outcomes and budget lines present in project
support grant making, where the grant is for “only this.”
This all/but approach falls within the boundaries of acceptability
for both general support grants and expenditure responsibility. With
regards to general support, the grantee retains decision-making
control over two key aspects: one, the activities that they choose to
conduct and, two, how the funds are expended within the broad
limitations of not spending funds on prohibited expenditures.
Combined, these offer the grantee great autonomy and latitude.
Prior training on appropriate expenditures can, again, be provided by
the foundation, and the understanding can be confirmed through the
PGI and written grant agreement. Expenditure responsibilitycompliant reporting can take either the approach outlined above, or
can show how foundation funds were expended for non-lobbying
purposes. Because the crucial aspect of general support grant making
is that funds are not tied to particular projects or outcomes at the
outset, it seems acceptable to consider reporting that shows
foundation funds were expended on acceptable purposes after the
fact, as long as there was no prior earmarking of funds.234
The value of the all/but approach is that it can apply to the greatest
number of situations; however, it also presents a variety of potential
burdens and risks. For example, this approach would require a
certain level of training for the grantee in order for the foundation to
build sufficient confidence that the grantee knows what activities to
avoid with the foundation’s funds. In addition, this approach presents
the same threshold problem as noted above: The foundation will have
233. See supra Section I.B.2.
234. This suggestion is a bit more extreme, but could technically apply to all three
suggested scenarios.
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to exercise discretion about whether, based on the percentage
breakdown of the organization’s activities, there remains a sufficient
percentage of acceptable uses for the expenditure responsibility funds
that there is still true decision-making authority for the grantee
organization about how those funds are expended, thereby allowing
the foundation to avoid the actual or perceived earmarking of funds
for particular purposes.
Ultimately, this approach requires a
foundation to feel comfortable that detailed reporting at the end of a
grant does not lend the perception of under-the-table earmarking at
the beginning of a general support grant.
However, the fact that foundations are not responsible for the
failure of a grantee to adhere to expenditure responsibility obligations
supports the idea that lawmakers retained some trust in foundations’
commitment to promoting the public good, and are to be given some
discretion in how they conduct their grant making activities. This
discretion can be used to determine the appropriate level of depth for
the PGI or, perhaps, to determine when a grantee organization might
be sophisticated enough to manage an all/but approach to an
expenditure responsibility general support grant. This determination
can be easily documented in the PGI documents. Appendix F
contains a sample grantee report for this potential approach.235
B. Recommendations for Minor Adjustments to the C.F.R.
As referenced above, there are a variety of minor clarifications and
updates that the IRS could make to the C.F.R. and the I.R.M. that
could help to clarify how to approach general support grant making in
a manner that upholds the expenditure responsibility requirements
yet also provides grantees with greater discretion and control over
grant funds.
First, the IRS could issue a general statement that clarifies that
general support can, in fact, be made under expenditure
responsibility, as the regulations state. Specifically, the IRS should
state that, should the expenditure responsibility requirements (PGI,
written proposal, signed grant agreement, final reports, and
foundation disclosure to the IRS) be satisfied, the IRS will accept that
general support grants are in alignment with existing law and policy,
and will not undertake further enforcement action.
Second, the IRS could amend the C.F.R. and the I.R.M. to include
further guidelines that clarify how general support grants can be
made under expenditure responsibility, perhaps utilizing the three
235. See Appendix F.
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potential approaches illustrated above. It is important to note that
these clarifications would not only remain in alignment with the
currently existing regulations, but would require no amendments to
be made to the U.S. Code. Therefore, this falls solely within the
ambit of the IRS.
Specifically, the IRS should provide for a general support safe
harbor in the case of expenditure responsibility general support
grants if the grantee conducts merely a de minimis amount of
lobbying activities or other prohibited expenditures, in the same way
that the IRS provides this safe harbor for general support grants to
501(c)(3) organizations and equivalents that conduct a de minimis
amount of lobbying or other prohibited expenditures. As described
earlier, many organizations that might otherwise be eligible to receive
equivalency determination cannot or do not pursue that option, not
because they conduct non-charitable activities, but because of
language barriers or lack of capacity. Therefore, creation of the
general support safe harbor would support the funding of those
smaller, grassroots organizations: not the funding of activities and
organizations otherwise considered not to be charitable.
In addition, the IRS could also honor the de minimis exception in
the case of international organizations that would otherwise be
considered a 501(c)(3) or equivalent. This approach would support a
pragmatic understanding of both the many reasons why foreign
organizations do not acquire equivalency determination status and
that money is fungible.
If the IRS is willing to consider adjustments that represent slight
departures from past practice (rather than simply a clarification of the
current regulations), the agency could also begin to accept attribution
in general support grant reports to particular foundation funds in the
limited scenario of a general support grant under expenditure
responsibility to a foreign organization. Based on the justification
that the crucial aspect of a general support grant is that grant funds
are not tied to particular activities at the outset, not that the
foundation remains fully unaware of how their funds were spent at
the close of the grant, this would allow foundations to use the all/but
approach outlined above without the concern that requesting
financial reports with attribution would somehow generate the
perception of earmarking.
By taking any or all of these suggestions, the IRS would be clear
about its intention to allow general support grant making in the
context of expenditure responsibility. By being clear, they would
encourage foundations to make a higher number of general support

2018]

GENERAL SUPPORT GRANTS

1341

grants, knowing that they are not at risk of having to pay excise taxes
or, in the worst case, losing their exempt status.
CONCLUSION
Providing grantees with unrestricted, flexible funds through
general support grants is crucial to fostering greater social impact,
prompting innovation, and supporting the development of strong
organizations. Given the plain text and policy intentions of the
expenditure responsibility regulations—as well as the broad and
effective regulatory framework in which foundations reside—it is
reasonable to interpret said regulations in a manner that allows the
use of general support. The time has come for foundation managers,
legal counsel, and even the IRS to take a fresh look at the
expenditure responsibility requirements and act on the potential that
general support grant making offers. Whether it be through
expanded use of the general support safe harbor or by taking an
all/but approach to funding, foundation staff have a variety of options
to match varying levels of risk appetite for using general support
under expenditure responsibility, even in lieu of any formal
clarifications by the IRS. With this approach, foundations will better
equip grantee organizations to take-on and succeed in meeting the
real-world challenges of their social missions, such as expanding
human rights, fostering arts and culture, improving public health, and
expanding education worldwide.
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APPENDIX A: EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS236
The expenditure responsibility requirements, as laid out in 26 U.S.C.
§ 4945 and associated regulations, provide:
Expenditure responsibility means that the Foundation exerts all
reasonable efforts and establishes adequate procedures:
1. To see that the grant is spent only for the purpose for which it
is made,
2. To obtain full and complete reports from the grantee
organization on how the funds are spent, and
3. To make full and detailed reports on the expenditures to the
IRS.
. . . and may involve one or more of the following elements:
1. Pre-grant inquiry
2. Certain commitments by the grantee
3. Requirements relating to program-related investments
4. Actions with respect to violations of expenditure responsibility
requirements
To meet the expenditure responsibility requirements, each grant
must be made subject to a written commitment signed by an
appropriate officer, director, or trustee of the grantee organization.
This commitment must include the following agreements by the
grantee:
1. To repay any amount not used for the purposes of the grant,
2. To submit full and complete annual reports to the grantor
foundation on the manner in which the funds are spent and the
progress made in accomplishing the purposes of the grant,
3. To keep records of receipts and expenditures and to make its
books and records available to the grantor at reasonable times and
4. Not to use any of the funds to influence legislation, to influence
the outcome of elections, to carry on voter registration drives, to
make grants to individuals or other organizations or to undertake any
nonexempt activity, when such use of the funds would be a taxable
expenditure if made directly by the foundation.

236. 26 U.S.C. § 4945 (2014); 26 C.F.R. § 53.4945-5 (2018).
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY FINANCIAL
REPORT
The following sample financial report illustrates how a grantee can
demonstrate to a foundation funder that foundation funds were spent
only on permitted activities. In this sample, the grantee shows that
Foundation A funds were spent on non-lobbying activities associated
with “Project A.” The corresponding narrative report would describe
the “Project A” activities in more detail, allowing a Foundation to
confirm that the grantee used the funds on permitted expenditures
only. In this scenario, the only funds with expenditure responsibility
restrictions attached are those from Foundation A.

Projected
Personnel

Actual

Fdn A

Govt Grant
150,000

Gen’l Fund

180,000

180,000

30,000

Rent

20,000

20,000

20,000

Utilities

10,000

9,800

9800

Travel

10,000

9,500

Lobbying

70,000

73,000

Activity 1

35,000

34,500

34,500

Activity 2

35,000

38,500

38,500

Lobbying

110,000

107,000

Activity 1

25,000

32,000

32,000

Activity 2

25,000

19,000

19,000

Activity 3

25,000

26,500

26,500

Activity 4

35,000

29,500

22,500

TOTAL

180,000

180,000

Office

9500

Project A

Non-

7000

Reserves
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Projected

Actual

Lobbying

50,000

38,000

Activity 1

50,000

38,000

Lobbying

50,000

62,000

Activity 1

50,000

62,000

TOTAL

100,000

100,000

Fdn A

Govt Grant

[Vol. XLV
Gen’l Fund

Reserves

Project B

38,000

Non-

62,000

Project C
Lobbying

0

0

NonLobbying

100,000

102,000

Activity 1

55,000

53,000

Activity 2

15,000

17,500

15,000

500

Activity 3

30,000

31,500

5,500

26,000

TOTAL

100,000

102,000

600,000

601,300

280,000

219,300

53,000
2000

GRAND
TOTAL

100,000

“Fdn A” = Foundation A
“Govt Grant” = Government Grant
“Gen’l Fund” = general donations, made by private individuals, that the organization
can use as they please
“Reserves” = the grantee’s reserve fund

2000
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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY PROPOSAL
This sample expenditure responsibility grant proposal provides a
projected organizational budget. The organization bifurcates the
budget, demonstrating their understanding of U.S. funding
restrictions. If Foundation A were considering a $100,000 grant to
this organization, they can feel comfortable knowing that there are
sufficient ways that the organization can spend those funds on
permitted (e.g., Non-Lobbying) activities.
Projected Organizational Budget
OVERHEAD
Personnel
Office Rent
Utilities
Travel
TOTAL

200,000
25,000
10,000
15,000
250,000

PROJECT A
Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Activity 3
Activity 4
TOTAL

20,000
15,000
5,000
250,000
95,000
50,000
45,000
60,000
270,000

PROJECT B
Lobbying
Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
TOTAL

0
50,000
50,000
50,000

PROJECT C
Lobbying
Activity 1

5000
5,000

1346

Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Activity 3
TOTAL
Total Overhead
Total Lobbying
Total Non-Lobbying
GRAND TOTAL

FORDHAM URB. L.J.
Projected Organizational Budget
95,000
55,000
15,000
25,000
100,000
250,000
25,000
395,000
670,000

[Vol. XLV

2018]
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APPENDIX D: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 1
This sample expenditure responsibility financial report shows
actual spending as compared to the originally projected
organizational budget. Though the actual spending is slightly
different than what was projected, the Foundation can see that there
are many ways the $100,000 grant could have been spent that aligns
with prohibitions on funding (specifically, $643,020 of the budget).
The narrative report would confirm that the grantee did only apply
the grant to permitted activities.
Projected Organizational
Budget

Actual Spending

Overhead
Personnel
Office Rent
Utilities
Travel
TOTAL

200,000
25,000
10,000
15,000
250,000

200,000
25,000
9,800
13,400
248,200

PROJECT A
Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Activity 3
Activity 4
TOTAL

20,000
15,000
5,000
250,000
95,000
50,000
45,000
60,000
270,000

19,200
13,000
6200
247,300
94,900
46,200
45,000
61,200
266,500

PROJECT B
Lobbying
Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
TOTAL

0
50,000
50,000
50,000

0
50,020
50,020
50,020

PROJECT C
Lobbying
Activity 1

5000
5,000

2000
2,000
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Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Activity 3
TOTAL
Total Overhead
Total Lobbying
Total Non-Lobbying
GRAND TOTAL

FORDHAM URB. L.J.
Projected Organizational
Budget
95,000
55,000
15,000
25,000
100,000
250,000
25,000
395,000
670,000

[Vol. XLV
Actual Spending
97,500
56,500
14,000
27,000
99,500
248,200
21,200
394,820
664,220

2018]
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APPENDIX E: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2
This sample expenditure responsibility financial report
demonstrates actual spending—just as in the sample provided in
Appendix C—but also demonstrates how the organization covered
the limited number of costs that could not be funded by the
expenditure responsibility grant. This way, the Foundation has
assurance that grant funds were used appropriately, while still
avoiding attribution of Foundation funds that might lend the
appearance of earmarking.
Projected Organizational
Budget

Actual
Spending

OVERHEAD
Personnel
Office Rent
Utilities
Travel
TOTAL

200,000
25,000
10,000
15,000
250,000

200,000
25,000
9,800
13,400
248,200

PROJECT A
Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Activity 3
Activity 4
TOTAL

20,000
15,000
5,000
250,000
95,000
50,000
45,000
60,000
270,000

19,200
13,000
6200
247,300
94,900
46,200
45,000
61,200
266,500

PROJECT B
Lobbying
Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
TOTAL

0
50,000
50,000
50,000

0
50,020
50,020
50,020

PROJECT C
Lobbying
Activity 1

5000
5,000

2000
2,000

Organization
General Fund

19,200

2000
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Non-Lobbying
Activity 1
Activity 2
Activity 3
TOTAL
Total Overhead
Total Lobbying
Total Non-Lobbying
GRAND TOTAL

FORDHAM URB. L.J.
Projected Organizational
Budget
95,000
55,000
15,000
25,000
100,000
250,000
25,000
395,000
670,000

[Vol. XLV
Actual
Spending
97,500
56,500
14,000
27,000
99,500
248,200
21,200
394,820
664,220

Organization
General Fund

21,200

GENERAL SUPPORT GRANTS

2018]
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APPENDIX F: SAMPLE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 3
In this sample financial report, the grantee provides a full
breakdown of how they applied specific funds to specific activities.
This allows Foundation A to confirm that the expenditure
responsibility grant covered solely permitted costs. This is an
acceptable report for a general support grant because the grantee still
had the ability to choose where to spend the funds, they are simply
now reporting on what decisions they made.

Projected Organizational
Budget

Actual
Spending

Fdn A

Fdn B

Govt
Grant

Gen’l
Fund

150,000

50,000

10,000

12,500

OVERHEAD
Personnel

200,000

200,000

Office Rent

25,000

25,000

Utilities

10,000

9,800

Travel

15,000

13,400

250,000

248,200

20,000

19,200

Activity 1

15,000

13,000

Activity 2

5,000

6200

250,000

247,300

Activity 1

95,000

94,900

50,000

Activity 2

50,000

46,200

46,200

Activity 3

45,000

45,000

3,800

Activity 4

60,000

61,200

270,000

266,500

Lobbying

0

0

Non-Lobbying

50,000

50,020

Activity 1

50,000

50,020

50,000

50,020

TOTAL

2,500

9,800
10,000

3400

PROJECT A
Lobbying

Non-Lobbying

TOTAL

13,000
6200
44,900
41,200
61,200

PROJECT B

TOTAL
PROJECT C

50,000

20

FORDHAM URB. L.J.
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Projected Organizational
Budget
Lobbying

Actual
Spending

[Vol. XLV
Fdn A

Fdn B

Govt
Grant

5000

2000

5,000

2,000

Non-Lobbying

95,000

97,500

Activity 1

55,000

56,500

56,500

Activity 2

15,000

14,000

14,000

Activity 3

25,000

27,000

27,000

100,000

99,500

Total Overhead

250,000

248,200

0

2,500

Total Lobbying

25,000

21,200

0

0

Total Non-Lobbying

395,000

394,820

100,000

147,500

147,300

GRAND TOTAL

670,000

664,220

100,000

150,000

317,300

Activity 1

TOTAL

Gen’l
Fund
2000

170,000

75,700

0

21,200
20
96,920

